Response to an IRV Advocate

``As a whole, while single-winner election system reform is certainly important, it is much less important than making the move to Proportional Representation.''

Consider the structure of the US federal government, which consists of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch obviously has a single winner. And that winner, the President, nominates the members of the Supreme Court (although Congress can reject those nominations, it has no power to put its own preferred judges on the court). Two of the three branches of the federal government are therefore essentially controlled by single-winner elections. Of the two houses of Congress, furthermore, PR may only be practical for the House of Representatives. That leaves only half of one of the three branches that is not controlled by single-winner elections. Consider also that single-winner reform would affect even the House of Representatives. Even without PR, therefore, the House will still be more representative than it is under the current system, diminishing somewhat the need for PR. PR is certainly a worthwhile goal, but it is less important than single-winner electoral reform.

``The leadership of the PR movement is not terribly interested in spending a lot of time debating Pairwise vs IRV.''

If IRV were clearly superior or even comparable to the Condorcet pairwise method, the statement above might be understandable, but it is not. In fact, many election system experts believe that IRV is clearly inferior to Condorcet. It is unfortunate that the leadership of the PR movement seems to have prematurely closed its mind on this crucially important issue.

``We've pretty much decided to push IRV, because it is equal to Pairwise on theoretical grounds, and superior on pragmatic grounds.''

The Condorcet pairwise method beats IRV on several important theoretical criteria, but I don't know of any theoretical criterion for which IRV beats Condorcet, nor can I think of any pragmatic advantage of IRV. As explained above, IRV is very good at preventing minor parties from disrupting the two-party system, but only if the minor parties never become truly competitive. As soon as they become competitive, the entire political system could become chaotic under IRV.

IRV has a very significant practical disadvantage when it comes to counting the votes. IRV requires every ranked ballot to be available at a central location, which can be a logistical and security nightmare in a large election. Consider the US presidential election as an example (and assume that the electoral college has been abolished, as it should have been long ago). Suppose that 10 candidates are running and 100 million ranked ballots are cast. With IRV, all 100 million ranked ballots must be sent to a national center and stored there (or the counts must be sent one round at a time, which is complicated). That is, you cannot even start counting until you have the data from every single separate ranked ballot available, because it is impossible to know in advance which candidates will be eliminated and how the votes will transfer. The transfer and storage of that much data is certainly possible with modern technology, but it is much more complex and prone to security problems.

Under Condorcet, on the other hand, the votes of a race with 10 candidates can be reduced to a 10x10 pairwise matrix. Each precinct can determine its pairwise matrix and send it off to a regional center. Each regional center can then determine its 10x10 matrix (by adding all the precinct matrices) and ship it off to the county. The process continues until the overall national 10x10 matrix is determined at the national center. The winner is then determined according to the rules of the Condorcet system. The total amount of data transfer is drastically less than for IRV, and verification and security are drastically simpler.

``Pairwise has a bit of a problem with handling circular ties.''

The ambiguity of a circular tie is a true ambiguity in the preferences of the electorate. The fact that Condorcet accurately recognizes such an ambiguity is not a deficiency, but rather a strength. Rather than ignore it and choose the winner capriciously, Condorcet allows the ambiguity to be resolved rationally and fairly.

``Note that IRV winners will tend to be those with enthusiastic support, while Pairwise winners will tend to be compromise candidacies.''

That's one way to put it. Another way to put it is that IRV can allow a relatively small group of zealots to prevail over the consensus of the majority. The enthusiastic support of a minority of voters should not be enough to elect a candidate unless some degree of the enthusiasm spreads to a majority, and if it does it will be reflected perfectly accurately in Condorcet voting.

``Pairwise has a potentially fatal flaw: Since a voter's second choice could easily help defeat their favorite candidate, campaigns might very well ask their voters to bullet vote. This is reality - it killed the Bucklin system.''

It is misleading to say that ``a voter's second choice could easily help defeat their favorite candidate.'' It can only happen in the case of a cyclic ambiguity in which the majority of the other voters rank that voter's second choice over his first choice. But if a voter votes on the assumption that such a situation will occur, he is more likely to hurt than help his own cause. In any case, the Bucklin system is completely irrelevant.

``IRV has a huge advantage over pairwise from the point of view of PR activists. When we write up ballot language for STV [single transferable vote], we can use exactly the same language for IRV.''

This claim is both misleading and revealing. It is revealing because it indicates that PR advocates may biased toward IRV for reasons that have nothing to do with a desire for single-winner reform. It is misleading because the Condorcet single-winner method could be adapted to the multi-winner case just as easily as IRV can, by simply applying it repeatedly, starting over after each winner is ``eliminated'' from the counting (or, even better, by using Tideman' method, which is discussed elsewhere at this site). The result may not be exactly proportional representation, but neither is the result when IRV is adapted to PR in the form of STV, as suggested.

``IRV is tested and proven in public and non-governmental elections. Pairwise, to my knowledge, has never been used in a public election, and is very rare in non-governmental elections.''

IRV has certainly been tested, but has it passed or failed the test? Australia, where IRV has been used since around 1920, still has a predominantly two-party system, and parties rarely field more than a single candidate in a general election for fear of splitting the vote. And the fact that Condorcet has never been used in public elections is hardly a reason to preclude it from consideration. Where would we be today if such ``reasoning'' had prevailed against voting itself when first proposed?

``We need to remember that voters typically have a strong preference for one candidate. They are not dispassionate machines simply ranking preferences. Pairwise advocates tend to forget that if I rank the candidates, B, A, C, D, that it might very well mean that if I had one dollar to spend to help each candidate that I might give 90 cents to B, 10 cents to A, and zero cents to C and D.''

First of all, the premise is not necessarily true. Campaign workers and other fierce partisans usually have a strong preference for one particular candidate, but I suspect that most voters are not so devoted to a single candidate--unless they believe that a particular candidate is their ``only hope,'' which is usually the case in our current plurality system.

Secondly, the mathematics of ranked balloting are such that it hardly matters how much a voter prefers one candidate over another. Only the order matters, as it should. After all, if only two candidates were running, would it matter how much a particular voter preferred one over the other? Suppose unsure voters could give 6/10 of their vote to one candidate and 4/10 the other. That would be equivalent to reducing the weight of their vote to only 1/5 of a vote. How many voters would voluntarily reduce the weight of their vote by a factor of 5, regardless of how unsure they were? Not many, I suspect.

``I strongly suspect that in the real world, the Condorcet winner and the IRV winner would be the same person about 90% of the time. So realistically, is the difference really worth much? I doubt it.''

Even if it is true, this conjecture misses a key point. The actual results of elections are only the most visible effect of an election method--the ``tip of the iceberg.'' Less visible but just as important is the overall effect of an election method on the entire political system, because that determines what choices the voters have in elections. I strongly suspect that, in the real world, an IRV system would perpetuate the two-party duopoly indefinitely, whereas Condorcet could actually promote a genuine multi-party system.

``Note that anyone can come up with scenarios which favors their position, in any debate.''

That's why we have objective mathematical criteria, many of which favor Condorcet, and none of which favor IRV.

``I can not cite the source, but it has been shown mathematically that in a public election it is virtually impossible for a voter to vote strategically in any useful manner when using IRV.''

This claim is both wrong and misleading. First of all, unless or until a third party seriously threatens the two major parties, it is very easy to vote strategically in an IRV system. In fact, it is identical to voting strategically in the current plurality system. If a third party ever does threaten the two major parties, then it will indeed become very difficult to vote strategically under IRV. However, this difficulty is hardly an advantage. It is, in fact, a huge disadvantage. Voters would be in a terrible predicament in which they desperately need to vote defensively to oppose their worst political adversaries, yet cannot figure out how to do so. The entire political system could be thrown into chaos, and parties considered unacceptable by a large majority could get elected.

``Pairwise advocates often throw up all kinds of IRV horror stories and suggestions of strategic voting. But in reality, none of this has ever happened, despite IRV's extensive use in Australia and Ireland, much less non-governmental elections.''

The problem with Australia is that it still has a predominantly two-party system even though IRV has been in use since around 1920. Australian voters still routinely vote strategically for the ``lesser of two evils.'' So what good has IRV done? In Ireland, on the other hand, it is used for a largely ceremonial office.

The horror stories begin if and when a third party seriously challenges the two major parties, which has not yet really happened under IRV. As explained, voters would then be in a dilemma in which they desperately need to vote strategically but are unable to figure out how to do so.

``We need to avoid the mistake of thinking that voters think like we do. The typical voter is anything but a mathematician and election system analyst.''

If voters are unable to figure out the best vote in support of their principles and wishes, they will be informed by experts. The fact that sincere voting is likely to backfire under IRV will not stay secret for long.

``One potential ugly result with pairwise could occur. A virtual unknown rogue candidate could insert themselves into what is effectively a two-person race, position himself as the middle candidate, and win.''

If the voters vote for an ``unknown'' candidate simply to defeat a candidate they're sure they dislike, then they are taking a calculated risk. That may or may not be wise, but it is surely the right of voters to do so--or do IRV advocates think that election methods should prevent voters from making unwise choices? If so, perhaps we should eliminate voting altogether and just let the wise advocates of IRV select our leaders!

Detailed Rebuttal to Arguments in Favor of IRV

© [...] revision 1, 12/20/97

SUMMARY:

(1) The Pairwise system is a strong and fair single-winner election system. In fact, on purely theoretical gorunds, it can be said that no system is superior to it.

So far so good. But I'd add that when Irving says "Pairwise", he's referring to the general classification of pairwise-count methods. Actually some of those are excellent and some have little merit. The excellent ones are the versions of Condorcet's method, named after their original proponent, the 18th century founder of voting theory. I won't devote a lot of space to introducing that method here, because that's done elsewhere at this website. Let me just say that, with pairwise-count methods, if more people rank A over B than vice-versa, then A is said to "beat" B. And if one candidate beats each one of the others then he wins.

Pairwise-count methods differ in what they do when, due to a "cycle", where, for instance, A beats B beats C beats A, no candidate is unbeaten. One of the refined interpretations of what Condorcet meant to do in that instance is known as Sequential Dropping (SD). SD probably has the most support among Condorcet advocdates, as the best Condorcet proposal. Here's its simple rule for when there's no unbeaten candidate:

"Drop the weakest pairwise defeat that's in a cycle. Repeat till there's an unbeaten candidate."

(The strength of B's defeat by A is measured by how many people ranked A over B. In other words, a defeat's strength is the number of people who voted for that defeat).

Although Irving is only comparing IRV here to pairwise-count methods, and so that's what my reply is about, I should add that there's another method that's also much better than IRV: The Approval method. Because I might mention it later, let me briefly define it: Approval is like Plurality except that the voter can mark more than 1 name on the ballot if he so wishes. He can mark as many as he wishes, and by doing so he gives 1 whole vote to each candidate whom he marks. I like Condorcet best, but Approval is a close 2nd.

Irving continues:

(2) However, when other factors are taken into consideration, I have a preference for IRV ("Instant Runoff Voting", also known as the Instant Run-off System, IRO, Majority Preference Voting, the Alternative Vote, and other names).

(3) As a whole, while single-winner election system reform is certainly important, it is much less important than making the move to Proportional Representation.

People who consider single-winner reform to be of secondary importance should leave it to others. I urge Irving to promote Proportional Representation, and to leave single-winner reform to people who take it seriously enough to inform themselves about it. Some of us feel that IRV advocates are trying to push IRV on you because it resembles a PR method that they want to lead into. Sometimes they admit it. Irving gets into that later in this article that I'm replying to.

I don't oppose PR, but recent decades have shown that it isn't winnable in the U.S., and certainly is nowhere near as winnable as single-winner reform. PR is a whole different concept of representation. Single-winner reform would just improve the fairness of the same elections that we now conduct. People express great suspicion of their representatives and the interests behind them. A complete change in the concept of representation is viewed with suspicion therefore. So it makes more sense to work on the kind of reform that's winnable. Contrary to the claims of IRV advocates, the use of a genuinely better single-winner method would make a tremendous difference. Admittedly that wouldn't be true of IRV.

Irving continues:

COMMENTS:

(1) The positions in the paper are based on my experiences, readings, discussions with people strongly advocating various systems, values, and judgements. Since different people have different values, judgements, etc., I don't expect this paper to necessarily convince someone who strongly advocates Pairwise that they should change their position. Rather, the idea is that they understand where I, and to some degree the PR movement as a whole, are coming from on this issue.

Yes, different values & judgements. For instance, we all agree that majority rule is important, and that we'd like to get rid of the lesser-of-two-evils problem, but Irving has his own unusual definitions of those things:

Irving, along with other Irvies, seems to feel that if, after we've eliminated all but 2 of the candidates, if we then elect the one of those 2 who is ranked over the other by more people than vice-versa, then we're carrying out majority rule. What about if we've eliminated a candidate who, from the start, had majorities over each one of the other candidates? That doesn't seem to bother Irvies.

Say I take you to a restaurant, and give you the menu, and say "You can have whatever you want." You point to something and say "I'll have that." I say "You can't have that. Which of these 2 do you want?" If you believe that I've given you what you want, then you'll believe that IRV carries out majority rule.

Say we define the following method: Determine which 2 candidates are the 2 most despised of all the candidates. Hold an election between just those two. If a majority then vote one over the other, then we can justify electing him by saying that we've carried out majority rule, right? Well maybe not :-)

I'll comment about Irving's concept of the lesser-of-two-evils problem when he talks later about evidence.

Irving continues:

(2) This paper officially reflects my position only. The leadership of the PR movement is not terribly interested in spending a lot of time debating Pairwise vs IRV.

If the leadership of the PR movement had spent more time on differences like that, then maybe they wouldn't now be promoting a meritless method. But I hope the leadership of the PR movement can forgive me for commenting on such things as IRV vs Condorcet, IRV vs Approval, and IRV vs Plurality. Before you adopt a new single-winner method, it's best to hear the arguments pro & con. Don't let a "reform" be pushed on you by someone who doesn't reply to discussion of its problems, or who objects if his opponents tell you of the proposal's disadvantages.

Irving continues:

Of the leadership of the PR movement, I believed I've studied the issue the most. We've pretty much decided to push IRV, because it is equal to Pairwise on theoretical grounds, and superior on pragmatic grounds

Irving neglects to say what sort of a theory he used for determining that IRV is theoretically equal to Condorcet :-)

Elsewhere at this website is a page that defines & discusses criteria for evaluating & comparing single-winner voting systems, such as IRV, Condorcet, Approval, & Plurality. Check out that Criteria webpage. You'll find that IRV is inferior to Condorcet by every criterion that distinguishes betweent the two. And IRV is inferior to Approval by every important criterion.

A criterion is a precise yes/no test for comparing what voting systems will or won't do, as a way of comparing & evaluating their merit. Criteria are the way of saying something precise about what a method will or won't do.

(2) Pairwise has a bit of a problem with handling circular ties.

Wrong. Circular ties aren't specifically a problem of pairwise- count methods. When, due to a cycle, every candidate is pairwise-beaten, that remains true no matter what the method is. Sure, IRV ignores the pair defeats, because it doesn't reliably count everyone's preferences. Ignoring something doesn't make it go away. So, no matter what voting system is used, when there's a circular tie, any candidate whom you elect will be someone who is pairwise-beaten. The difference is that Condorcet deals with that, by dropping weakest defeats, and that Condorcet is the method that reliably counts all of the preferences that you vote.

Irving continues:

All methods that I've heard of for handling them have problems: 2nd elections, "cheatproof", etc.

In typical form, Irving neglects to tell us of the problems that he claims that every circular tie solution has.

Irving continues:

(3) Note that IRV winners will tend to be those with enthusiastic support, while Pairwise winners will tend to be compromise candidacies.

Irving is completely missing the point of rank balloting. The whole idea is so that you can cast a vote for a compromise against someone less-liked, while still casting a vote for your favorite over the compromise. If we're a rugged noncompromiser like Irving, and we aren't interested in compromises, then we have no reason to be interested in rank-balloting. Plurality would then be fine for us: Just vote for your favorite, you courageous noncompromiser!

But if you do choose to rank a compromise, you do so in order to vote for him against someone you like less. You want that vote counted. Sorry, Irving, but it isn't for you to say that that preference doesn't get to be counted. And of course, all you rugged noncompromisers can refuse to compromise in Condorcet if you want to, by only voting for your favorite.

Irving continues:

Neither, therefore, is inherently superior to the other, it is simply a matter of approach, a value judgement.

...except that IRV is drastically inferior to Condorcet by every criterion that distinguishes between the two--and only a few of the trivially weak criteria fail to distinguish between them.

Irving continues:

(4) Pairwise has a potentially fatal flaw: Since a voter's second choice could easily help defeat their favorite candidate, campaigns might very well ask their voters to bullet vote. This is reality - it killed the Bucklin system.

I replied earlier to Irving's claim that IRV has an advantage in not letting your lower choices hurt your favorite: IRV avoids that by eliminating your favorite before it lets you help your 2nd choice. Oh thanks. I also suggested considering a method that's the same as Plurality, except that you can list a 2nd choice, but it isn't counted. It's then assured that your 2nd choice vote can't hurt your favorite--of course it can't count for your 2nd choice either. That's what we have with IRV, except that your 2nd choice vote might or might not be counted.

Also, with IRV, it will often be necessary for you to insincerely vote your 2nd choice in 1st place, to prevent someone worse from winning. But if you do that when, unknown to you, your 1st place could have won, then you'll give the election away to the 2nd choice. When you do that, your support for your 2nd choice _is_ making your 1st choice lose.

With Condorcet, when your favorite has a clear win, when your favorite is the candidate who'd beat each of the others in separate pairwise contests, voting a 2nd choice can't hurt your favorite's win. Actually, all that can happen is that, when your favorite _isn't_ that universal winner, and if for some reason there's so much indifference that the universal winner doesn't have majorities against the other candidates, then, by not ranking that candidate, you could gain victory for your own favorite instead. That's the only sense in which you can gain by voting a short ranking instead of a complete ranking. But note that it's an offensive strategy that can only work if the there's so much indifference about the universal winner that he doesn't have a majority against your candidate.

As for Bucklin, Condorcet isn't Bucklin, and Irving's statements about Bucklin have no relevance to Condorcet. Besides, in Bucklin, voting only for one's favorite is the best strategy when you believe that your favorite has a win. Maybe when Bucklin was used, people believed that their favorite had a win. Maybe , in those municipal elections, they were above using strategy, and preferred, on principle, to vote only for their favorite. There's nothing wrong with that choice. It certainly doesn't mean that Bucklin failed. This Bucklin thing is a common mis-statement that we frequently hear from the promoters who are trying to push IRV on you.

Irving continues:

Luckily, there are a couple of ways to handle this: (a) use the "cheatproof" tiebreaker [need to get the definition from Mike Ossipoff again], (b) require voters to fully rank the ballot. However, both of those methods have their own disadvantages.

Again, Irving forgets to tell us what the alleged problems are. Condorcet is by far the most problem-free voting system. IRV is a problem-ridden strategic mess.

Irving continues:

(5) IRV has a huge advantage over pairwise from the point of view of PR activists. When we write up ballot language for STV, we can use exactly the same language for IRV. We've handled multiple-winner reform and single-winner reform in one fell swoop. If we proposed STV for multiple-wnner elections, and pairwise for single-winner elections, ...

Here is where Irving admits why he wants to sell you an inferior single-winner method: He, and his other Irvie friends, like IRV because it leads right into something else that they want. IRV would provide precedent for a PR system that the IRVies want to get enacted. Those of us who take single-winner reform seriously resent the IRVie contemptuous attempt to use single-winner reform as a stepping stone for something else.

"...multiple winner reform & single-winner reform in one fell swoop"? A very clumsy fell swoop, a one-size-fits-all sales-pitch that is a lie, because IRV is quite inadequate as a single-winner reform. I encourage multiwinner method advocates to promote multiwinner methods, but they should be ashamed of trying to sell you a worthless single-winner reform because they think it would lead into a multiwinner method that they like.

Actually, some of us believe that wouldn't happen. We believe that IRV won't lead into anything except embarrassment. IRV will discredit rank balloting, electoral reform, and the uninformed promoters who are pushing it.

Irving continues:

We'd have to write language for two systems, and explain two systems - not very attractive.

Ok, so Irving wants to use a PR system for single-winner elections, to save himself from having to write separate language? :-) And the fact that his PR method is no good for single-winner elections doesn't stop him from trying to waste your time with it.

Irving continues:

(6) IRV is tested and proven in public and non-governmental elections. Pairwise, to my knowledge, has never been used in a public election, and is very rare in non-governmental elections.

In what sense is IRV proven? It's been used in Ireland for their Presidential elections. But an Irishman told me that that office is a ceremonial office. IRV is used for one house of Austrialia's Parliament. But Irving hasn't offered any data to show that IRV doesn't do, in those elections, the undesirable things that I've been saying that it is sure to do. "Proven"? Irving hasn't proven anything. As I said, parties in Australia rarely run more than 1 candidate in IRV elections, in spite of the fact that, when IRV was instituted, it was hoped that they would, so that voters could have more selection. Parties apparently fear a "spoiler problem". I've been told by an Australian that parties have a difficult time getting their voters to vote for their favorite candidate in 1st place, instead of giving 1st place position to whichever of the big two parties' candidate they like better than the other--a problem that I'd predicted, and one that's familiar to U.S. voters.

Irving continues:

(7) We need to remember that voters typically have a strong preference for one candidate. They are not dispassionate machines simply ranking preferences. Pairwise advocates tend to forget that if I rank the candidates, B, A, C, D, that it might very well mean that if I had one dollar to spend to help each candidate that I might give 90 cents to B, 10 cents to A, and zero cents to C and D.

Nonsense. You might just as well rate your 1st 2 choices equally, and rate your 3rd choice much lower. In any case, it's common for voters to dump their favorite in order to support a 2nd choice compromise. They'll do it in IRV too, because they'll have to. They won't have to in Condorcet or Approval.

8) I strongly suspect that in the real world, the Condorcet winner and the IRV winner would be the same person about 90% of the time. So realistically, is the difference really worth much? I doubt it.

So we should choose a new voting system based on Irving's "I strongly suspect..."? IRV fails the voter often enough that there's no reason to settle for that meritless method.

Irving continues:

(9) Note that anyone can come up with scenarios which favors their position, in any debate.

Good, so where are the scenarios that favor IRV? :-)

If anyone can come up with scenarios that favor his favorite method, then it's curious that Irving doesn't include any such scenarios that favor IRV. And if it's true that anyone can do that, would that make all methods equal? Not unless you think all the "scenarios" are equally important, or that the arguments based on them are equally valid or important.

Instead of referring to "scenarios", I refer you to the webpage, at this website, about criteria. With critera, we can talk about what methods will or won't do.

Irving continues:

Therefore scenarios have their uses, but have huge limitations. Much stronger evidence includes real world experience and studies that follow good scientific and statistical principles.

Irving neglects to say what those limitations are. He speaks of much stronger evidence that includes real-world experience, including scientific & statistical studies, but Irving, true to form, doesn't offer us any such evidence.

Irving continues:

(10) I can not cite the source, but it has been shown mathmatically that in a public election it is virtually impossible for a voter to vote strategically in any useful manner when using IRV.

Irving can't cite the source because there isn't one, unless it's Irving or some other Irvie. Not only can you vote strategically in a useful manner in IRV, but sometimes IRV forces you to do so. Sometimes you'll have to use the strategy of dumping your favorite in order to prevent your last choice from winning.

Irving continues:

(11) Pairwise advocates often throw up all kinds of IRV horror stories and suggestions of strategic voting. But in reality, none of this has ever happened, despite IRV's extensive use in Austrilia and Ireland, much less non-governmental elections.

Irving offers us no proof for his claim that those predicted failures didn't happen. Why doesn't he cite a source of information here? Why doesn't he tell us what data support his claim, or how they support it? Because he has no data that support his claim.

I doubt that the kind of data are reported & recorded, in countries that use IRV, that would show that IRV does or doesn't do the undesirable things that I & others say that IRV must do.

Irving has no data.

But it's known that in Australia's IRV elections, parties rarely run more than 1 candidate, even though, when IRV was adopted there, it was hoped that its use would encourage parties to run more candidates, to give the voters more selection. But it didn't happen. Apparently the parties fear that their candidates will split the vote & lose. In other words, IRV in Australia has demonstrated a spoiler problem.

An Australian told me that in Australia's IRV elections, the parties other than the big 2 have a difficult time getting their voters to vote their party in 1st place, because the voters feel a need to vote tactically, voting their more preferred of the big-2 candidates in 1st place. In other words, IRV voters suffer from the lesser-of-2-evils problem.

No, I haven't gone there myself, and my only information is from that Australian. But the person who told me of that problem was someone who had no incentive to make up an IRV problem.

The rarity of parties running more than 1 candidate in IRV elections is well-established.

Ireland uses IRV too, for its Presidential elections. But an Irishman told me that he wouldn't expect any strategy incentive anyway in that election, since that election is for a ceremonial office only. And again, Irving offers no data from Ireland, just as he offers me no data from Australia.

Irving continues:

(12) We need to avoid the mistake of thinking that voters think like we do. The typical voter is anything but a mathmatician and election system analyst.

So what? It doesn't take a mathematician or an election system analyst to know that he needs to dump his favorite and vote for a lesser-evil. It happens in Plurality, and it will happen in IRV. And if you don't sometimes dump your favorite in IRV, then you'll regret it (because, in the U.S., some of us will be publishing the data that will show IRV's failures and violations of majority rule, and its failures to count your preferences that are important to you).

Say there are 2 extreme sides, and a Middle. Sometimes it's necessary to for 1 extreme to insincerely vote Middle in 1st place to avoid the election of the opposite extreme. If your extreme makes sure that it only errs in the direction of sincerity, in the direction of not putting Middle in 1st place when you should, and if the opposite extreme makes sure that it errs only in the conservative direction, in the direction of sometimes putting Middle in 1st place even when it isn't necessary, then your side is being had: IRV's swings to extremes will only go to the opposite extreme, never to yours. If you keep voting so sincerely, if you keep being had in that manner, then you're a sucker.

If both extremes start out voting sincerely, or trying to err only in the sincere direction, then one side will surely start taking advantage of the other side's naiveness. And that victimized side will soon putting Middle in 1st place more, erring conservatively, if they know what they're doing.

So sincere voting in IRV is an unstable situation. It won't last.

Does Irving think that no one will tell the voters how they can improve their outcome by insincere voting? No one will tell their faction how to get a better result?

Irving continues:

(13) In Pairwise, the middle candidate is the King. In IRV the middle candidate is the Kingmaker. I find either situation to be fair and acceptable.

I prefer the electorate to be "king", and to have their expressed majority wishes honored, and to have all their individual expressed preferences counted. I don't want Irving to play kingmaker with our elections.

Irving continues:

(14) One potential ugly result with pairwise could occur. A virtual unknown rogue candidate could insert themselves into what is effectively a two-person race, position himself as the middle candidate, and win.

This is Irving's "unknown middle" argument.

First of all, the voters are adults, and we must assume that they're qualified to make their own evaluations & choices.

If someone is a "rogue", then no one forces you to vote for him. If you don't believe that someone is a rogue, then it should be your right to vote for him.

I find it a little scary that someone in this country can say that you shouldn't be allowed to have your preference for Middle vs Worst to be counted, because you might not know enough about Middle. That's for _you_ to judge, not for Irving to decide for you. Perhaps Irving would like to take the right to vote away altogether, because you might make a bad choice, or not correctly identify a disguised rogue.

Additionally, the voter median position will be a popular & crowded place for candidates, especially as Condorcet or Approval encourages more people to run. So how likely is it that the only person at the voter median position will be some unknown rogue? There will be wellknown & well-understood candidates there.

Also, aside from all that, the media will call into question candidates' claims of their positions or their background. Opposing candidates won't keep quiet about that either. Irving is being silly when he says that you won't have any way of knowing about the candidates near the voter median position.

Irving continues: Once elected, who knows?! IRV does not have this problem because it requires that you get a lot of #1 votes in order to win.

"IRV does not have this [nonexistent] problem" because it often ignores your expressed preference for your 2nd ranked candidate over your last choice. Thanks a lot, IRV :-)

IRV erratically & capriciously swings to the extremes when it ignores your expressed preferences. Almost as scary as Irving's reluctance to count your preferences is IRV's swings to extremes. What kind of candidates will IRV elect when it does that? Let's not find out.

Irving continues:

RESPONSES:

[Irving wordily repeats his claim that single-winner reform can't really bring significant improvement]

Then please, Irving, promote PR instead of promoting a meritless single-winner method. But then I guess that's why Irving doesn't feel guilty about trying to sell you a worthless single-winner method--he's contemptuous about single- winner reform anyway. Could it be that someone with that attitude wouldn't care about merit differences between single-winner methods? Yes it could. Don't buy from someone who doesn't care.

Irving continues:

(2) "Let's say that 41% of the voters vote A,B,C, 39% vote C,B,A, 10% vote B,A,C, and 10% vote B,C,A. With IRV A would win. Yet most voters prefer B to A! How can you call this democratic???" First of all, as Note 3 (above) points out, IRV rewards enthusiastic support, while pairwise rewards compromise candidates. In IRV, A wins because A has a combination of ...

I don't know about you, but I don't want Irving to decide whom to support, which candidate to favor, whose support is more important. I want a method that simply counts the preferences that I vote.

Irving continues:

In IRV, a wins because A has a combination of the most enthusiastic support, along with enough support from B's supporters to put his/her candidacy over the top. Neither is inherently superior to other. I'm very comfortable with Pairwise, and would be happy to see Pairwise used, and B win in this scenario. I'm also very comfortable for IRV to be used, and A to win in that scenario. Secondly, see Notes 8 & 9 (above).

I included the preceding passage so that I won't be accused of selectively leaving out argument. What I said above applies to the above passage.

Irving continues:

(3) "Referring to Response 2, just above, if B were to run directly against A, B would win. Clearly then, B should win the election, refuting the claim that IRV is as democratic as pairwise." You don't know that this would happen in reality. The fact is that the dynamics of a multi-person race are different than the dynamics of two-person races. For example, if voters were more focussed on just candidates A and B, and B came under more scrutiny, then B might lose a lot of votes. A lot of voters might be

Here Irving is desperate. He seems to be claiming that the preference that you voted isn't valid because you might change your mind and later hold a different preference (!!??).

He says that if you knew more about the candidates, you might not have the preferences that you have, and I guess he thinks that therefore it's ok if he & his count method ignore your preference.

Here Irving, like an fugitive driven into a corner, is trying a bizarre & desperate ploy.

Irving continues:

A lot of voters might be putting B as their #2 ranking simply because the main race is A v.s. C, and they are really attacking each other, and B is the "other" candidate. This is the problem with scenarios - they are too simplistic.

Irving is suggesting that some voters will try "offensive order-reversal". But please note that, with IRV, you'll need defensive order-reversal even if no one's using any offensive strategy. IRV itself will often make you sorry if you don't insincerely vote some compromise in 1st place, dumping your favorite.

Offensive order-reversal would be a risky and devious thing to try. It will tend to backfire, and so it will be well-deterred.

But in any case, Irving shouldn't be saying anything about strategy, when his method is the one that often forces you to reverse your preferences & dump your favorite. The criteria at the Criteria webpage at this website specify IRV's failures in that regard, as compared to Condorcet & Approval.

Irving continues:

(4) "I am a registered Republican, but I lean toward libertarianism. In a pairwise voting system, I would tend to vote for the libertarian first and the Republican second (depending on the actual candidates, of course). However, in an IRV system, I would vote for the Republican first and the Libertarian second. Why? Because in the IRV system, nothing beyond the first choice matters unless no candidate gets a majority. If the Democrat gets a majority, I "wasted" my vote on the Libertarian just like I would in the current system. That is, I failed to help prevent the Democrat from getting the majority." This shows a misunderstanding of how IRV works. In any system, if the Democrat has support from a majority of the people, it wouldn't much matter how you vote, except for registering a protest or a statement. In reality, if IRV was used, and you voted Lib, Rep, Dem, your vote would be registered for the Libertarian, then be transferred to the Republican once the Libertarian was defeated. Exactly what you want.

Wrong. The only way you can be sure that your vote will transfer to the Republican (from your Libertarian favorite) is if your favorite is a sure loser. Because if your favorite has any chance of winning, then he could just as well eliminate the Republican and then lose to the Democrat.

The reason why we want to support our favorite, in 1st place, is that we hope that he might eventually (or now) have a chance of winning. So then, how much sense does it make to offer you a method that makes it safe to vote your favorite in 1st place only if he's a sure loser. That's the kind of offer that could only come from someone who is contemptuous of single-winner reform, someone who is uninformed about it, and someone who is rather contemptuous of you too. Someone who wants to sell you garbage in order to further a goal of his, in which his he hopes that his garbage single-winner method will provide precedence for something else that he wants to get. You, my friend, are being used.

Irving continues:

(5) "With IRV, your second ranking has zero meaning, zero power, unless your first choice loses. With pairwise each ranking has power, so pairwise is superior." This is both pairwise's biggest strength and its biggest weakness. The fact is that your second choice could help defeat your first choice, by forcing a circular tie. That is terrible, anad must be dealt with, or pairwise would never work in the real world, because campaigns would ask their supporters to bullet vote (see Note 4, above).

"That is terrible"? It's also untrue. Your vote for your 2nd choice won't "force" a circular tie, or cause one. That was a naive statement from someone who is talking about things that he isn't qualified to talk about.

Now, what _could_ cause a circular tie would be if you dropped from your ranking the candidate who'd otherwise win by beating everyone. But the only way you could gain from doing that would be if that "universal winner" who would have beaten everyone doesn't have a majority against your own candidate, due to a huge amount of indifference.

In other words, it isn't that you can cause a circular tie & suffer because you voted a 2nd choice. All that you could lose thereby would be a possible opportunity to try to _cause_ a circular tie, in an attempted offensive strategy that couldn't work anyway unless that universal winner from whom you'd like to steal the election is regarded with so much indifference that there's no majority ranking him over your own candidate.

I'm sorry if that's wordy or complicated. I wanted to fully answer Irving's claims, since he'll no doubt be using his faulty argument again. Now, Irving said that Condorcet's practice of actually counting your preferences is a weakness. Does that sound as bizarre to you as it does to me?

Irving continues:

However, it doesn't follow that having one advantage means one system is superior to another.

Condorcet & Approval don't just have one advantage over IRV. By every important criterion, IRV is inferior to both Condorcet & Approval. IRV pretty much fails every criterion that's strong enough to actually distinguish between the proposed methods. I'd like Irving to try to name a criterion that IRV meets but which Condorcet doesn't meet.